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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
are two possible constructions,' 8 "resort to a literal construction may not be had
when the result would be to thwart the obvious and dearly expressed purpose
which the parties intended to accomplish, or where such a construction would lead
to an obvious absurdity."'1
The dissenters claimed that the "plain meaning" of the contract was that
just such an occurrence as this was covered; water was one of the specific
exceptions to what was excluded from coverage. They believed the court was now
rewriting the contract for the parties according to what the parties intended. The
majority decided in part on the assumption that the court must interpret the
contract, where there is an ambiguity, as a reasonable business man would. The
dissent contended that there was no ambiguity.

MISCELLANEOUS
Suit on Payment Bonds
In McGrath v. American Surety Co., 1 plaintiff, a supplier of labor to a subcontractor, sued to recover, on a payment bond given by the latter to indemnify the
general contractor against liability to the subcontractor's suppliers of labor and
materials under the Miller Act.2 The Miller Act imposed upon the general contractor an obligation to furnish the Federal Government with both performance
and payment bonds in public works projects. Parties such as the plaintiff, who have
no contractual relation with the general contractor but have with a subcontractor,
are given an action on the payment bond. The defendant is a surety on a common
law bond given by the subcontractor. Whether plaintiff has a cause of action on
this common law bond or whether his sole remedy would be under the Miller Act
was the issue; the Court held, plaintiff had no cause of action. "The rights o f these
laborers and materialmen of the subcontractor were definitely fixed and considered to be protected adequately by the Miller Act. The object in giving the
bond in suit was to protect the contractor against this very liability imposed upon
him by Federal Law."3
18. HartoZ Products Corp. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 290 N. Y. 44,
47 N. E. 2d 687 (1943). The dissent cites Mutchnick v. John Hancock Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 157 Misc. 598, 284 N. Y. Supp. 565, (1935), for the proposition that
whether the results to the insured are harsh or beneficial there is no warrant for
interpreting the deliberate language of the policy in other than Its natural
meaning.
19. McGrail v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 292 N. Y. 419, 55 N. E. E,
2d 483 (1944).
1. 307 N. Y. 552, 122 N. E. 2d 906 (1954).
2. 40 U. S. C. 270-a, 270-b.
3. 308 N. Y. 464, 126 N. E. 2d 750 (1955).

THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1954 TERM
A closely related problem was considered in the same term by the Court in
Daniel Morris Co. v. Glens Falls Indemnity Co.3 There a supplier of materials to a
contractor sued to recover on a payment bond executed by the defendant as
surety, the subcontractor as principal and in favor of the general contractor as
obligee. A separate performance bond was also executed between the parties.
The Court held that the plaintiff had a cause of, -action on the common law
payment bond. "The inference is irresistable that the parties intended to benefit
unpaid materialmen." The fact that separate performance and payment bonds were
given, together with the language used in both the payment bond and underlying
contract, that the contractor agreed to furnish materials and labor "free of the lien
of any third party," the Court felt evidenced an intent to benefit the plaintiff.
Whether third party suppliers of labor or materials have a good cause of
action on a payment bond appears to turn on whether the parties in executing
the bond intended to benefit them,4 and whether they relied on .such bond in
extending credit.5 In determining intent to benefit, the courts rely on a number
of factors including the precise wording of the bond itself,6 the wording of the
'underlying contract between the principal and obligee (where the contract is made
part of the bond to explain it7 or even where the contract is not expressly made
part of the bond),8 the public policy behind a statute the bond was given to
satisfy, and whether or not performance and payment provisions are contained
in the same or separate bonds.' 0 If one bond contains both performance and
payment provisions, it will be held to be for the purpose of protecting the obligee
only, on the theory that any payment made to creditors of the principal will tend
to exhaust the penalty named in the bond, to the detriment of the bond's performance provisions." Where there are separate performance and payment bonds,
the instant cases indicate that third party suppliers will be able to sue on the
payment bond unless there is another apparent purpose for having separate bonds.
Non Resident Admissions to the Bar
Petitioner in Application of Harvey'2 applied to the Appellate Division
under former Rule II of the Court of Appeals for admission to the New York Bar
without examination, on the ground that he had been admitted to and practiced
4. Ibid.
5. Buffalo Cement Co. v. McNaughton, 156 N. Y. 702, 51 N. E. 1089
(1895).
6. Mclare v. Massachusetts Bonding and Insurance Co., 266 N. Y.
371, 195 N. E. 15 (1935).
7. Duffy Co. v. Board of Education, 280 N. Y. 773, 21 N. E. 2d 527 (1939).
8. See note 3 supra.
9. Fosmire v. National surety Co., 229 N. Y. 44, 127 N. E. 472 (1920).
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. 309 N. Y. 46, 127 N. E. 2d 801 (1955).

